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The determinants of union membership in the UK are analysed using the BHPS
(1991-2003). The paper employs three alternative methodologies to control for the prob-
lem of initial conditions. Trade union membership is found to be persistent even after
controlling for the unobserved e⁄ect. There is evidence of a considerable correlation be-
tween the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the initial condition. Ignoring this
overstates the degree of state dependence of union membership greatly. The extent of
state dependence in union membership status is notably higher in the (1991-1996) period
estimates and appears to be more pronounced in the case of male employees for the entire
period under consideration. Concerning the observed heterogeneity the estimates suggest
that an individual￿ s propensity to unionise is determined by a mixture of industrial and
personal characteristics that have a di⁄erential impact on male and female propensities.
Key Words: union membership, initial conditions, unobserved individual het-
erogeneity, state dependence, dynamic random e⁄ects probit models
Subject Classi￿cation: [JEL classi￿cation] C23, J51
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyses the determinants of union membership in the U.K during
1991-2003. We are interested in answering two questions:
i. What are the characteristics of the individuals who join trade unions?
ii. Is union membership a persistent phenomenon?
The legal framework governing collective bargaining arrangements in the United
Kingdom was substantially altered during the 1980￿ s. Stewart (1995) provides a
concise account of the successive legislative changes that were targeted towards
weakening the bargaining strength of UK trade unions.
The introduction of the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts strengthened the case
for claiming unfair dismissal on the basis of an employee￿ s refusal to enter a closed
shop. The 1982 Act dictated that all post-entry closed shops had to be sanctioned
1The views presented in this paper are the author￿ s and do not re￿ect those of the BHPS data
depositors, namely, the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex,
U.K.
2I am grateful to Je⁄rey Wooldridge, Michigan State University, for his comments and sug-
gestions. I would also like to thank Keith Hartley, John Bone, John Hutton and Andrew Jones
at the University of York and Mark Stewart, University of Warwick, for their valuable help. All
errors and omissions remain my own.
1via a ballot of the workforce. The successive 1988 and 1990 Employment Acts
prohibited all means to enforce a closed shop and thus, rendered post-entry and
pre-entry closed shops, respectively, illegal. The overall e⁄ect was that the 1980s
was a decade of a dramatic decline in aggregate trade union membership and union
recognition in the UK (Stewart, 1995, pp.143-45).
Changes in the pattern of trade union membership and union recognition in
the UK have been studied by a number of authors (e.g. Booth, 1986; Gregg and
Naylor, 1993; Andrews and Naylor, 1994; Wright, 1995; Disney et al, 1996; Disney
et al, 1999). Most of these studies employ cross-sectional data and are, therefore
unable to control for unobservable individual speci￿c e⁄ects something that might
well result in biased estimates of the e⁄ect of observable attributes. Upon failing
to let the e⁄ects of the explanatory variables be time dependent the e⁄ects of
establishment characteristics are particularly prone to bias (see Arulampalam and
Booth, 2000, p.290).
For instance, Booth (1986) using the 1975 National Training Survey, ￿nds that
establishment characteristics generally have a signi￿cant impact upon the proba-
bility of trade union membership while personal attributes, with a few exceptions3,
typically do not. Wright (1995)4 suggests that gender does not di⁄erentially a⁄ect
an individual￿ s trade union membership decision although labour market experience
is found to be positively associated with membership.
Arulampalam and Booth (2000) using data from the National Child Develop-
ment Study was the ￿rst longitudinal study of the patterns of changes in individual
membership across time for a single cohort of individuals (young men) in the UK.
However, the nature of their data set does not allow them to discriminate between
calendar time and life-cycle e⁄ects.
Given that closed shop practices have been e⁄ectively outlawed in Britain, in-
dividuals will voluntarily opt to enter the unionised sector only if the net expected
return of union membership is positive and/or when management is supportive of
union membership which is likely to occur under a non-adversarial style of indus-
trial relations regime. On the other hand, provided that unions standardise wages
for all workers within a sector an individual might as well not join, and thus not
incur any costs such as an initiation fee, and instead free ride. In fact, the degree
of free riding with regard to trade union membership is substantially larger in the
UK as opposed to the US (see Arulampalam and Booth, 2000).
Costs and bene￿ts of potential union membership are quite hard to quantify and
the relevant data are not always available. Individuals might opt to become trade
union members so as to bene￿t from incentive private excludable goods available
only to trade union members. Arulampalam and Booth (2000) summarise these
as protection against unfair dismissal, discrimination due to ethnic minority group
membership, grievance procedures, pension plans advice and the implementation
of well-de￿ned dismissal arrangements in recessionary periods (p.291). Naylor and
Raaum (1993) note that trade union membership can be "in￿ uenced by both social
custom e⁄ects and by resources devoted by management to opposing unionisation"
(p.591). Farber (1983) emphasises that "workers are heterogeneous in their prefer-
ence for union representation to the extent that workers of di⁄erent characteristics
derive di⁄erent amounts of pecuniary and non-pecuniary bene￿ts from unionisa-
tion" (p.1420).
3Age and education for females and experience for males.
4Employs the 1986 Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) dataset.
2Unobserved individual heterogeneity plays an important role in modelling union
membership status and failing to control for this provides biased estimates. How-
ever, it should be remembered that the existing data restrictions mean that we can-
not attribute any speci￿c e⁄ects entirely to unosberved heterogeneity. This study
employs longitudinal data and by controlling for unobservable individual-speci￿c
e⁄ects it aims to assess the degree of state dependence of union membership and
estimate the importance of observable and unobservable characteristics on union
status determination.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the data,
sample selection and explanatory variables; Section 3 the estimation methodology;
Section 4 presents and explores the estimated results; and Section 5 concludes.
2. DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) originated in 1991 and follows the
same representative sample of individuals over a number of time periods. The ￿rst
wave of the Panel (1991-92) consisted of 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals
drawn from 250 regions of Great Britain. In 1999 further samples of 1,500 house-
holds in the cases of both Scotland and Wales were added and in 2001 a sample of
2,000 households from Northern Ireland was included in the survey.
The data were split into two balanced panels (1991-1996 & 1997-2002) compris-
ing of employees aged between sixteen and sixty ￿ve, excluding full-time students,
that have participated in all of the respective six waves of the survey.5 The ECHP6
samples and the new Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland samples were selected
out.
The traditional practice in union literature is to use male manual full-time
employees in order to estimate the determinants of union membership (see Swa¢ eld,
2000, p.439). However, this study uses a full- time male employees￿sample and a full
sample of female employees (full-time and part-time inclusive of female employees
on maternity leave).
Part-time male employees were excluded from the male regression sample used in
this study in that the small gains in terms of sample size are more than outweighted
by the costs of a potential increase in the heterogeneity of the male regression
samples.
In addition, the full female sample can provide a comparison group against the
male full-time employee sample that could potentially su⁄er from selectivity bias.
According to Swa¢ eld (2001) it might be possible, however, that the female sample
is also prone to sample selection bias caused by the labour market participation
decision (pp.439).
Further disaggregation towards a male manual full-time sample was not per-
formed however as it would be fairly costly in terms of sample sizes. Descriptive
statistics Tables for the respective selected samples are provided in Tables (II,III)
in the Appendix and include of a set of personal and industrial characteristics.
5Proxy respondents allocated zero weights by the data depositors, by default, were selected
out.
6European Community Household Panel survey.
32.1. Trade Union Membership
The dependent variable is an indicator function taking a value of one if an
individual is a trade union member and a value of zero otherwise. An individual
is taken to be a trade union member if he or she has responded positively to the
question "Are you currently a member of: Trade Unions" in the Social and Interest
Group Membership section of the BHPS. The respective variable in the BHPS data
set is "Member of trade union". Unfortunately, this question was only asked every
other year after the ￿fth wave (1995-96) of the survey since, the data depositors
believe that there is not a lot of movement in and out of organisations and therefore,
it was not felt necessary to ask this every year.
A further union membership variable which is available in the BHPS, "Member
of workplace union", can be used as a proxy for union membership for waves six
(1996-97), eight (1998-99), ten (2000-01) and twelve (2002-03). This variable is
derived through the question that was asked conditionally following a positive
response to the question "Is there a trade union, or a similar body such as a sta⁄
association, recognised by your management for negotiating pay or conditions for
the people doing your sort of job in your workplace?".7
Following this response, a positive reply to "Are you a member of this trade
union/association?" is recorded as membership of workplace union which includes
"in-house" sta⁄ associations, but excludes employers￿organisations. This intro-
duces a degree of discontinuity in the BHPS data regarding trade union member-
ship as this broader de￿nition is also inclusive of sta⁄associations, but, nevertheless
when one wishes to undertake a longitudinal analysis spanning all of the ￿rst and
last six waves of the BHPS this is the only alternative available.8
The "Union or sta⁄ association at workplace" variable allows us to construct
a measure of union coverage. However, the fact that an individual￿ s workplace is
covered by a trade union that is recognised by management for bargaining purposes
does not necessarily imply that this particular individual will actually be a member
of the union.
According to Andrews et al (1998) while at the individual level members and
non-members doing the same job within the same establishment earn the same
wage, when comparing across establishments trade union membership is "a closer
indicator of a di⁄erential than coverage"(p.453).
Thus, to conclude. The cross-sectional time series trade union membership
variable constructed for all twelve waves of the survey su⁄ers from a certain de-
gree of discontinuity. Nevertheless, the two alternative questions available in the
BHPS make it feasible to construct a measure of union membership. The individ-
ual responses from the two alternative union membership questions and the union
coverage outcomes can be compared in order to detect any potential measurement
error in union membership responses (see Swa¢ eld, 2001). However, this is beyond
the scope of this paper.
The descriptive statistics reveal that male union membership during (1997-2002)
has fallen by 15.32 percent compared to the (1991-1996) levels. The respective
female union membership rate has actually risen by 9.49 percent so that by the last
cross section of the survey female unionisation rates converged to the level of male
unionisation rates at a marginally higher percentage.
7The resulting variable is termed as "Union or sta⁄ association at workplace".
8Swa¢ ed (2001) employs a similar approach.
42.2. Explanatory Variables
This section considers theoretical predictions, measurement issues and potential
shortcomings with regard to the explanatory variables employed in the reported
estimates. Table I displays the explanatory variables included in the trade union
membership models. These are split into two categories9, namely, individual and
industrial characteristics.
                                          Table I. Explanatory Variables
Personal Characteristics Industrial Characteristics
Sex Region
Employment Status Size of Workforce
Potential Labour Market Experience Industrial Classification (type of industry)
Marital Status
Ethnic Background




It is generally accepted that male and female employees have di⁄erent proba-
bilities of unionisation. The theoretical prediction is that females will have a lower
propensity to unionise due to their discontinuous labour market participation. The
existing empirical evidence suggests that there has been a change in the gender
composition of trade union members in Britain. Trade unions in the UK are cur-
rently more assiduous in their attempts to increase female membership rates. Budd
and Mumford (2004) using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (1998) show
that trade unions seem to positively a⁄ect the provision of parental leave, special
paid leave and job sharing options although a negative association was found with
respect to ￿ exible working hours options (p.220).
Commitments such as family care and maternity leave tend to disrupt female
labour force participation and hence, the inclusion of the marital status and mater-
nity leave variables in the female union membership models. Marital status is also
included in the respective male equations since in the "exit-voice" scenario individ-
uals with family obligations could seek greater job security through unionisation
(see Booth, 1986, pp.46-47).
Employment status is also expected to a⁄ect an individuals￿ propensity to
unionise. Theory predicts that part-time employees have a lower propensity to-
wards unionisation owing to their less stable and discontinuous participation in
the labour force (Booth, 1986, p.46). Hence, full-time10 employment controls are
included in the female union membership models along with maternity leave.
Labour market experience and age are expected to be positively associated with
the probability of unionisation. Bain and Elsheikh (1979)11 note that some trade
unions have provisions for superannuation and sickness bene￿ts thus, rendering
unionism a more attractive idea for older employees (Booth, 1986, p.47).
9The grouping of explanatory variables adopted follows Booth (1986).
10"Full-time" is de￿ned as employment requiring a minimum of 30 hours per week based on
total hours (including both normal and overtime hours).
11In Booth (1986).
5Disney et al (1999) employing data from the Family and Working Lives Survey12
￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences in the age-union membership pro￿le between cohorts
over the past 20 years in the UK. Union membership was highly persistent and
the probabilities of becoming a trade union member "have systematically declined
across successive date-of-birth controls" (Disney et al, 1999, p.1).
To obtain a measure of potential labour market experience further education
leaving age was subtracted from the individual respondents￿age at the time of inter-
view. Booth (1986) argues that using such a measure might actually over-estimate
female labour market experience given the discontinuity e⁄ects of maternity leave
and family care and instead proposes using age rather than experience.13
Ethnic minorities are also expected to have a higher propensity to unionise
in order to protect themselves against unfair labour market discrimination. The
"ethnic group membership" question of the survey was used to form the non-white
ethnic background dummies included in the estimated models. These are "Black"
(Caribbean, African and other), "Asian" (Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Bangladeshi)
and "Other Ethnic Minority Group".
Health status is a binary variable taking a value of one if the individual re-
spondent has reported "Fair, Poor, Very Poor Self-Assessed Health Status". It
is expected to have an adverse impact on the probability of active labour market
participation and thus to be negatively associated with trade union membership.
During the ninth wave (1999-00) of the survey "General state of health" was
provided in the place of "Health status over last 12 months" that was reported for
all of the remaining eleven waves. Given the discrepancy in the wording of the
self-assessed status question during the ninth wave of the survey, the corresponding
categorisations were recti￿ed accordingly to be brought in line with the remaining
waves.14
Educational attainment is expected to have a di⁄erential e⁄ect on individu-
als￿propensity towards unionisation. Abowd and Farber (1982) suggest that the
standardisation of wage rates via the bargaining process implies that workers with
a high degree of human capital invested in themselves would be less prone to be
union members in that they would expect to receive reduced human capital premia
within the unionised sector. Job queues for union jobs will therefore consist of
predominantly low skilled workers while employers within the unionised sector will
be aiming to employ those individuals with exactly the opposite characteristics in
order to minimise costs.
The "Highest Academic Quali￿cation" question of the survey was broken down
to construct four distinct dichotomous quali￿cation variables. These are, "First
University Degree or Higher", "Vocational Quali￿cations: HND, HNC, Teaching",
"A Level Quali￿cations" and "Secondary Education Quali￿cations: O Lever or
CSE".
The Standard Occupational Classi￿cation 1990 (S0C)15 is used to control for
occupational attributes and nine major (one digit) groups were formed. The occu-
pation of an employee can a⁄ect his propensity to unionise through the monopoly
position granted by his occupation. Highly skilled employees can be valuable as-
12Cross-section of individuals between 16-69 years old in 1994/1995 with retrospective informa-
tion on employment history.
13Estimations were performed with both measures and the respective results were fairly similar.
In the light of this, all reported models are inclusive of potential labour market experience.
14See HernÆndez Quevedo, Jones and Rice (2004).
15Refer to Appendix 3.9 (BHPS), Standard Occupational Classi￿cation (SOC).
6sets to employers and can thus have a strategic advantage over their low skilled
counterparts when extracting concessions from ￿rms (see Booth, 1986, p.48).
2.2.2. Industrial Characteristics
In the BHPS region, metropolitan area refers to the area of residence of an
individual respondent and does not indicate the location area of the establishment
since the BHPS is not a linked survey of individuals and establishments. Strictly
speaking, this invalidates the classi￿cation of region as an industrial characteristic,
although, the eventual grouping of the areas was su¢ ciently broad in order to
preclude any signi￿cant commuting.
Larger establishments are more likely to enjoy product market power and this
implies more quasi rents to be bargained over and a greater scope for unionisation.
It is generally hypothesised that probability of unionisation rises with the size of the
establishment.16 Booth (1986) postulates that the size of the individual￿ s workplace
and the type of industry enter the union membership model through their impact on
organisation costs. However, it might be the case that they are actually "proxying
union bargaining power and social custom" (p.48). Disney et al (1996) treat union
recognition as a function of plant size among other establishment characteristics
under the hypothesis that establishment size may be acting as a proxy for union
recognition.
The institutionalist view that large establishments act as if they were unionised
and subsequently o⁄er higher wages in order to avoid unionisation is of particular
interest to this study in that this would reverse the positive association between
union membership and the size of establishment. Brown and Medo⁄ (1989) em-
phasize that if union avoidance e⁄orts are a key part of the establishment size-wage
relationship such an association must be less pronounced for workers who seem very
unlikely to become union members. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that "how-
ever important union avoidance e⁄orts may be, they are not an important part of
the size-wage story" (p.1045). The BHPS provides a size of workforce variable and
this was used to form four distinct size groups.
Stewart employing data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (1984,
1990) provides evidence that during the 1990s unions on average failed to achieve
positive wage di⁄erentials and to gain recognition in establishments that were
opened post-198417, whereas, for older (pre-1984) establishments the average 1990
union wage di⁄erential remained at 1984 levels (Stewart, 1995; pp.160-161). Dis-
ney et al (1996) using data from the three Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys
(1980, 1984, 1990) also ￿nd a declining probability of trade union recognition in
new establishments.
Unfortunately, unlike the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) the
BHPS does not provide any information on the age of the establishment since is
not a linked data set of workplaces and individuals18 and therefore, this e⁄ect
cannot be controlled for.
16Hirsch and Addison (1986) provide a comprehensive review of a number of studies establishing
this.
17This e⁄ect was due to the introduction of the series of Employment Acts during the 1980s
coupled with the shift in the equilibrium of control away from unions and in favour of management
(see Stewart, 1995).
18On the other hand, Union membership in the Workplace Employee Relations (Panel) Survey
(1990-98), new WIRS, can only be proxied by a construction of a union recognition variable.
7Type of industry is controlled for by using the nine Industrial classi￿cation (one
digit) divisions. These were constructed using the Standard Industrial Classi￿cation
1980 (SIC)19 of the individuals￿employer in his current employment post. Given
that the coding frame was replaced by the Standard Industrial Classi￿cation 1992
from wave twelve onwards the latter was brought into line with the 1980 coding
frame.
Traditionally, education and the public sector have been two of the most heavily
unionised industries.20 Further, the "Public Administration, Education, Other21"
industrial classi￿cation is also associated with a higher proportion of individuals
that are either educated to university level or holding vocational quali￿cations. The
estimated models are therefore inclusive of interaction dummies between "Other
Services SIC and University Quali￿cation or Higher" and "Other Services SIC and
Vocational Quali￿cations".22
3. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
The dynamic reduced form model depicting the decision of an individual to
join either the unionised or non-unionised sector is outlined in equation (1) below.
The bene￿ts of employment within the unionised sector are captured by the latent
variable y￿
it. The union membership status of an individual i in period t, is indicated
by the dummy variable yit.
The unknown parameters to be estimated are (￿;￿)0 and xit is a vector of ex-
ogenous explanatory variables (personal and industrial characteristics). The com-
posite error term ￿it captures the unobserved individual heterogeneity underlying
the union membership decision and is decomposed into an individual-speci￿c com-
ponent "i and an individual time-speci￿c e⁄ect uit:
y￿
it = x0
it￿ + ￿yi;t￿1 + vit (1)
yit = I(y￿
it i 0)
vit = "i + uit; t = 1;:::;T; i = 1;:::;N
3.1. Potential Limitations
The combined e⁄ect of the 1988 and 1990 Employment Acts, that precede the
introduction of the BHPS in 1991 was the e⁄ective outlaw of both post-entry and
pre-entry closed shops (see Stewart 1995). This has the implication that individuals
undertake their unionisation decision on the basis of wages, individual preferences
and non-pecuniary bene￿ts without coercion.
Potential seniority and non-pecuniary bene￿ts can be su¢ ciently strong motives
for individuals to remain within the unionised sector, irrespective of wage changes,
and this introduces state dependence in the model (see Vella and Verbeek 1998).
The obvious drawback, however, of adding the lagged union membership variable as
19See Appendix 3.7 (BHPS), Standard Industrial Classi￿cation 1980 (SIC).
20The male union membership percentages in the "Public Administration, Education, Other"
industrial classi￿cation were {59.91, 57.97} during (1991-1996) and (1997- 2002) respectively. The
corresponding ￿gures for females are {45.85, 49.03}.
21"Other services" 1980 (SIC).
22The "Professional Occupations" classi￿cation is also characterised by a high proportion of
highly skilled individuals. However, interacting this with the "University" and "Vocational Qual-
i￿cations" controls has yielded neither statistically signi￿cant nor theoretically consistent results.
8a regressor is that it gives rise to the problem of initial conditions which is discussed
in greater detail in Section (3.2).
Of course, becoming a union member is also conditional upon the employer￿ s
hiring decision (see Abowd and Farber, 1982) and the primary de￿ciency of a re-
duced form union membership model is that it ignores the role of the employer in
determining union status. Despite the fact that in the reduced form union member-
ship model, employer attributes are captured through the industrial classi￿cation
dummies these are not adequate in order to assign any speci￿c e⁄ects purely to
unobserved heterogeneity (see Vella and Verbeek, 1998; p.164).
The estimations presented here are inclusive of the size of establishment as an
additional control concerning employer features, though as has already been men-
tioned in the previous section, the BHPS limits our ability to control for potential
establishment age e⁄ects on union membership.23
Another potential shortcoming of the model concerns free riding on union bar-
gained wages that apply to all employees within a covered establishment irrespective
of their union membership status. Booth (1986) argues that wages can be viewed as
a collective good by the individual therefore casting doubts on whether wages can
actually be considered as a determinant of an individual￿ s unionisation probability.
The collective good argument does not invalidate the theoretical prediction that
union density is potentially positively associated with higher wages. At the margin
an individual worker￿ s union membership decision might not be a⁄ected by the
level of wages set by collective bargaining. Primarily, this occurs because the indi-
vidual does not consider that his decision will make an important di⁄erence to the
aggregate union density in his sector. What is more, the "marginal" individual can
always free-ride (see Booth, 1986, p.44 & pp.58-59).
Some readers might consider the exclusion of wages from the sectoral choice
model of union membership as inappropriate. Wages can be included in the union
membership models to detect whether individuals do free-ride and an insigni￿cant
coe¢ cient can then validate the public goods theory of union wages given that
earnings are not proxying any omitted variables. However, according to Booth
(1986) this scenario is highly unlikely (p.44).
Vella and Verbeek (1998) suggest that the lagged value of union membership
status a⁄ects an individuals￿unionisation decision while it does not have any sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ect on the current wage. It is argued that union membership status
may capture movement costs that are not speci￿c to union employment. Work-
ers are therefore assumed to change union membership status only if they change
jobs. Furthermore, the long-term advantages of union employment, whilst generat-
ing persistence of union membership status, are not expected to have a signi￿cant
impact on wages and therefore lagged union membership status is expected to have
a minor e⁄ect on current wages (p.167).
The joint determination of union status and wages renders the coe¢ cients of
a single equation model inclusive of wages biased and inconsistent. Even if wages
and union status are not determined simultaneously, which is rather improbable,
wages might be acting as a proxy for omitted variables that are simultaneous such
as job security and pension provisions and this would produce biased results. Since
wages can be either a complement or a substitute of union negotiated non pecuniary
bene￿ts the direction of the bias cannot be determined a priori, thus rendering the
interpretation of the resulting coe¢ cients on wages problematic (Booth, 1986, p.
23Via the establishment "age e⁄ect" impact on union recognition (see Stewart, 1995).
943). A two-step methodology such as the one o⁄ered by Vella and Verbeek (1998,
1999b) provides a far more attractive alternative and this paper focuses on the ￿rst
stage estimation of reduced form models of union membership determination.
3.2. Estimation Procedure and the Problem of Initial Conditions
Modelling any stochastic process with structural dependence among time-ordered
outcomes requires initialising the process (Heckman, 1981a; pp.118). Initial condi-
tions do become irrelevant asyptotically as T ! 1 although, in the case of short
panels as is the case in this study the problem cannot be overlooked since T = 6
and asyptotics instead rely on N ! 1. The initial conditions problem occurs when
the initial value of the dependent variable is correlated with unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity. The presence of individual-speci￿c e⁄ects "i clearly invalidates
the assumption of exogeneity of union membership status in the ￿rst period of the
survey.
The initiation of the stochastic process determining union membership has been
in operation prior to initiation of the BHPS in 1991. This occurs since a large
fraction of individuals in the samples used were labour market participants before
1991. Thus, the initial value of union membership cannot be taken to be exogenous.
The conditional probability that an individual will become a union member in the
future is a function of past experience.
The initial conditions problem cannot be readily ignored since the random ef-
fects maximum likelihood estimator in its standard form will be inconsistent (see
Heckman, 1981a,c). Further, ignoring the correlation between individual-speci￿c
e⁄ects "i and the initial conditions will overstate the degree of state dependence.
State dependence and individual heterogeneity o⁄er "diametrically opposite"
explanations of the notion that those individuals who have experienced an event in
the past are more likely to do so in the future (Hsiao, 2003, p. 216).
Considering otherwise identical individuals it is possible that, those who have
experienced unionisation in the past will amend their preferences determining future
propensity to unionise (e.g. via potential seniority and non-pecuniary bene￿ts
pertaining to union membership). This is an entirely behavioural e⁄ect.
Alternatively, it is possible individuals di⁄er in speci￿c unmeasured variables
that a⁄ect their propensity to unionise while they are not in￿ uenced by experienc-
ing unionisation per se. In the event whereby such variables are correlated over
time, and are not appropriately controlled for, past experience may turn out to
be a determinant of the individuals￿future propensity to unionise since it acts as
proxy for the temporally persistent unobservables. This is what Heckman (1981a,
1981c) terms as "spurious state dependence" as opposed to "true (structural) state
dependence" occurring in the former scenario.
Union membership decision is modelled using the dynamic random e⁄ects pro-
bit speci￿cation given in equation (2). The random e⁄ects formulation was chosen
since in the case of dynamic models with large N and small T ￿xed e⁄ects pro-
duce inconsistent estimates of the parameters as di⁄erencing out "i generates a
linear regression model with lagged dependent regressors and serially correlated
disturbances. Further, the random e⁄ects probit model is used instead of its logit
counterpart since random e⁄ects yield correlations among the successive distur-
bances. For this purpose, the multivariate normal distribution is more ￿ exible than
the corresponding logistic distribution which requires that all correlations are equal
to 0.5 (see Maddala, 1987):
10y￿
it = x0
it￿ + ￿yi;t￿1 + "i + uit; uit ￿ N(0;￿2
u) (2)
The random e⁄ects model in its standard form assumes that "i is not correlated
with xit. The presence of the individual-speci￿c time-invariant e⁄ect "i, however,
renders the composite error term vit = "i + uit temporally correlated even when
the uit are taken to be serially independent. Adopting the Mundlak (1978)- Cham-
berlain (1984) speci￿cation we can allow for a correlation between "i and the time
means of the observed time varying characteristics taking the form of "i = x0
ia+￿i.
Substituting this expression for "i in equation (2) we arrive at speci￿cation (3)
where it is assumed that ￿i ￿ iidN(0;￿2




it￿ + ￿yi;t￿1 + x0
ia + ￿i + uit; uit ￿ N(0;￿2
u) (3)
The individual-speci￿c random e⁄ects framework suggests an equi-correlation,
￿, between any two successive disturbances for the same individual unit. Given
that yit is dichotomous, a normalisation is necessary and it is commonly assumed
that ￿2
u = 1. The resulting expression for ￿ is given in equation (4):





; t;s = 2;:::;T;t 6= s (4)
The initial conditions problem is tackled using three alternative estimation
methodologies suggested by Heckman (1981c), Orme (2001) and Wooldridge (2005).
Heckman￿ s solution to the initial conditions problem approximates the reduced
form marginal probability of the initial state by a probit function which has as its
argument all of the available pre-sample information on the exogenous variables
(Heckman 1981c, p. 188). Orme (2001) suggests a two step methodology which
is an approximation if the correlation between the initial condition and individual
random e⁄ects is weak. Wooldridge (2005) proposes an alternative approach which
involves modelling the distribution of the unobserved e⁄ect conditional on the initial
value and the observed history of strictly exogenous explanatory variables (p.40).
3.2.1. Heckman￿ s Estimator
Stewart (2006a) provides a Stata
R ￿
command, -redprob-, for Heckman￿ s estima-
tor of the dynamic random e⁄ects probit model. In the spirit of Heckman (1981c)
we specify a linearised reduced form for the initial observation given by equation
(5) where zi1 denotes a vector of strictly exogenous instruments such as pre-sample
information24 a⁄ecting an individual￿ s propensity to unionise, the vector of means
xi and xi1, ￿i is correlated with ￿ibut not with uit for t ￿ 2:
y￿
i1 = z0
i1￿ + ￿i (5)
In terms of orthogonal error components ￿i can be expressed as:
24The "year current labour force status began" variable in the BHPS allows us to obtain infor-
mation about the industrial/occupational classi￿cation for those individuals that have entered the
labour force prior to 1991 and 1997 in the two panels. Further pre-sample information variables
were constructed for the highest educational quali￿cation of those individuals aged over 25 at the
initiation of the respective panels.
11￿i = ￿￿i + ui1; ￿ ￿ 0 (6)
By construction (￿i;ui1) in equation (6) are independent of one another. Exo-
geneity of the initial conditions occurs when ￿ = 0. Further, it is assumed that ui1
meets the same distributional assumptions as uit for t ￿ 2. The linearised reduced
form for sectoral choice in the initial time period is given by:
y￿
i1 = z0
i1￿ + ￿￿i + ui1; t = 1; i = 1;:::;N (7)
The joint probability of (yi1;:::;yiT) for individual i, given ￿i, suggested by
Heckman￿ s methodology is shown in (8) where ￿ is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function:
￿[(z0





it￿ + ￿yi;t￿1 + x0
ia + ￿i)(2yi1 ￿ 1)] (8)
Thus, expression (9) denotes the likelihood function to be maximised for a
random sample of individuals. F stands for the distribution function of ￿￿ = ￿=￿￿
and given the normalisation adopted ￿￿ =
p
￿=1 ￿ ￿. Stewart (2006a) provides
a program for this maximum likelihood estimator whereby, assuming that ￿ is















3.2.2. Orme￿ s Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Orme (2001) o⁄ers a "pseudo maximum likelihood estimator" PMLE procedure
that recti￿es the standard MLE for the e⁄ect of previous event history. The linear
speci￿cation in terms of orthogonal disturbances in equation (6) allows for the
possibility of non-zero correlation r = corr(ai;￿i). Orme￿ s two-step methodology
is an approximation when r is local to zero (i.e. when the correlation between the
initial condition and the random e⁄ect is small).
Following Arulampalam et al (2000) we start with equation (3). Equation (6)
is rede￿ned as ￿i = ￿￿i + wi where by construction (￿i;wi) are orthogonal of one
another, ￿ = r￿￿=￿￿ and var(wi) = ￿2
￿(1￿r2). Substituting this new speci￿cation
for the random e⁄ect into equation (3) we arrive at:
y￿
it = x0
it￿ + ￿yi;t￿1 + x0
ia + ￿￿i + wi + uit (10)
We begin with the linearised reduced form for the initial observation equation
(5). Assuming that (￿i;￿i) are bivariate normal then E(wi j yi1) = 0 and E(￿i j







is the generalised probit residual25obtained from equation (5). Assuming that uit
is independent of xit we take wi to be the typical random e⁄ects probit error
component given that we replace ￿i by its conditional expectation.
25See Giourieroux et al (1987).
12The assumption of bivariate normality of (￿i;￿i) renders the error component
wi in the second stage random e⁄ects probit model in equation (10) heteroskedastic
since:











E⁄ectively then Orme￿ s two stage methodology involves estimating an "arti￿-
cial" random e⁄ects probit model which is augmented by the generalised probit
residual obtained from the ￿rst stage linearised reduced form for the initial period
equation (5) under appropriate normality assumptions.
The rationalisation of Orme￿ s approach is grounded on the assumption of r being
local to zero so that var(wi j yi1) ￿ = ￿2
￿. Note that since union membership is a
dichotomous variable the probit model for the initial period needs the normalisation
that ￿￿ = 1. Given the expression for ￿ in equation (10) we obtain r = ￿=￿￿.
Rearranging equation (4) we arrive at ￿2
￿ ￿ = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) and hence, an estimate
of r can be obtained by the expression provided in equation (13) where ￿ is the
coe¢ cient on the generalised probit residual from equation (10):
r = ￿
p
(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ (13)
The "pseudo log-likelihood" to be maximised includes lagged union membership
but treats yi1 as exogenous. Augmenting the set of regressors by ei "provides a
test of, and an approximate control for, the initial conditions problem". Locally
equivalent alternative methodology guarantees that the usual t-test of the coe¢ cient
of the generalised residual gives an asyptotically valid test of r = 0 (Orme, 2001;
pp.6).
3.2.3. Wooldridge￿ s Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Wooldridge￿ s (2005) solution to the initial conditions problem speci￿es a distri-
bution of unobserved individual heterogeneity conditional on the initial condition
instead of obtaining the joint distribution of all outcomes of the endogenous vari-
ables.
We begin by specifying the distribution of the unobserved e⁄ect as:
"ijyi1;xi ￿ N(￿0 + ￿1yi1 + x0
i￿2;￿2
￿); xi = fxi1;:::;xiTg (14)
where the (1xT) row vector xi contains all non-redundant explanatory
variables in all periods under consideration.
The presence of xi in expression (14) implies that we are not able to identify
the coe¢ cients on time-constant explanatory variables in xit although time-constant
explanatory variables can be included in xi and this is the main disadvantage of
Wooldridge￿ s approach. Including time-constant explanatory variables in xit will
only increase the explanatory power of the model as it is not possible to separately
identify the partial e⁄ect of time-constant variables from their partial correlation
with the unobserved e⁄ect (Wooldridge, 2005, p.44).
Of course, the implication of adopting the Mundlak (1978)- Chamberlain (1984)
device allowing for a correlation between "i and the time means of the observed
time varying characteristics, "i = x0
ia + ￿i, with the Heckman (1981c) and Orme
(2001) approaches is that the presence of the xi means that we cannot separately
identify the e⁄ects of time-constant variables there, either.








To ￿nd the joint distribution of (yi2;:::;yiTj yi1 = y1;xi = x) we need to in-
tegrate out ￿i. Integrating (15) against the Normal (0; ￿2
￿) gives the likelihood
function in expression (16) which is identical to the structure of the standard ran-
dom e⁄ects probit model with the only di⁄erence that the explanatory variables at
time t are fzit ￿ (1;xit;yi;t￿1; yi1; xi)g. It is assumed that data are observed for
each cross-sectional unit in all time periods although given speci￿c sample selection








t￿ + ￿yt￿1 + ￿0 + ￿1yi1 + x0￿2 + ￿)yt: (16)
[1 ￿ ￿(x0
t￿ + ￿yt￿1 + ￿0 + ￿1yi1 + x0￿2 + ￿)]1￿ytg(1=￿￿)￿(￿=￿￿)d￿
Essentially then, what Wooldridge (2005) suggests is that by adding yi1 and xi as
additional explanatory variables in each time period under consideration and using




This study focuses on the Heckman (1981c) and Wooldridge (2005) estimators.
Regarding Orme￿ s (2001) two-step methodology, the estimates of the correlation
between the initial condition and the random e⁄ect, r, were all in excess of 0:8. In
the light of this, we cannot ignore the inherent heteroskedasticity of the residual
component, wi, in the second stage random e⁄ects probit model (eq:10) as it pro-
duces inconsistent parameter estimates. The estimated results are therefore, not
reported here.
The requirement that r is local to zero under Orme￿ s estimator is quite a strin-
gent condition. Arulampalam et al (2000) looking at unemployment persistence
obtain signi￿cantly lower values of r. We would normally expect union member-
ship to be far more persistent than unemployment, in that the former entails long
term bene￿ts whereas long term unemployment reduces your employment proba-
bility. Therefore, the high correlation between the initial value and the random
e⁄ect found here is not surprising.
The remaining estimated models of union membership employing Heckman￿ s
(1981c) and Wooldridge￿ s (2005) estimators are provided in Tables (IV-VII) in the
Appendix. In all reported models the null under the Wald statistic26 for multi-
ple exclusion restrictions is rejected and hence, all inclusive covariates are jointly
statistically signi￿cant. Further, the estimated parameters generally possess the
theoretically predicted coe¢ cients.
The reported random-e⁄ects probit estimates were arrived at employing the
adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature method to compute the log likelihood and its
26LR for the pooled probit estimates.
14derivatives since the large group sizes and the sizeable within group correlations,
￿, in all of the estimated models made the non-adaptive quadrature approximation
inaccurate. The models were estimated by increasing the number of quadrature
points to 30 which is equivalent to increasing the degree of the polynomial approx-
imation (see Butler and Mo¢ tt, 1982).
The quadrature checks undertaken revealed that the coe¢ cient estimates were
nearly invariant27 to the quadrature point variation. The polynomial approxima-
tion with 30 quadtrature points is therefore su¢ ciently accurate and the estimated
results can be interpreted with con￿dence.
The major advantage of Wooldridge￿ s estimator is its computational simplicity
which reduces estimation time substantially compared to Stewart￿ s (2006a) com-
mand used to implement Heckman￿ s estimator. Wooldridge￿ s estimator for t > 1
was extended by a standard probit estimator for t = 1 to enable comparability with
Heckman￿ s estimator, although the latter still produced a superior log-likelihood for
all models under consideration. The estimates obtained using both approaches are
reported here as this reinforces the argument that the correlation between the ini-
tial condition and the unobserved heterogeneity results in an over-statement of the
extent of state dependence in union membership, more e⁄ectively.
Stewart￿ s -redpprob- command reports a pooled probit model for t > 1, the
estimates of the reduced form model for the initial observation28 and the dynamic
random e⁄ects probit estimates29 for t > 1. The pooled probit estimator treats
the whole sample as a large cross section therefore assuming away all cross period
correlation. This restrictive probit estimator provides an initial consistent estimate
of the parameters although it is ine¢ cient (see Maddala 1987) and the respective
estimates are only provided here to demonstrate the overstatement of the degree
of state dependence. The null hypothesis under the likelihood-ratio test for ￿ was
rejected in each of the estimated random e⁄ects probit models implying that ￿ 6= 0
and therefore, the reported pooled probit estimates for t > 1 are rejected in favour
of the random e⁄ects probit estimates.
Regarding both Heckman￿ s and Wooldridge￿ s estimators, the proportion of the
total error variation attributed to unobserved individual heterogeneity, ￿, was sig-
ni￿cantly higher in the (1997-2002) dynamic random e⁄ects probit models for both
male and female employees as opposed to the respective (1991-1996) estimates.
Further, the unobserved heterogeneity in the female random e⁄ects estimates gen-
erally constitutes a notably greater proportion of the unexplained variance of the
composite error term than it does in the corresponding male estimates.30
27Relative di⁄erences in the coe¢ cients were well below the subjective rule of thumb of a less
than one percent variation.
28The estimates of the reduced form model for the initial period are not reported here as they
are not of direct interest.
29The reported random e⁄ects probit estimates are inclusive of either a set of industrial or
occupational controls as the there is a certain degree of overlapping among the two classi￿cations.
Unless one of the two sets of controls was excluded, the maximum likelihood functions using the
-redprob- command would not converge due to this collinearity. The same exclusions were made
in the Wooldridge estimates for comparison purposes.
30Apart from the (1997-2002) Heckman estimator where ￿ was marginally higher in the model
for male employees.
154.1. The Persistence of Trade Union Membership
Turning to the exogeneity of the initial conditions, in the case of the Heckman
estimator this requires that ￿ = 0. It is evident that exogeneity31 is strongly
rejected in all models with the exception of the male (1991-1996) model where it is
rejected at the not so stringent 10% level of signi￿cance.
With regard to the Wooldridge estimator, the coe¢ cients on the initial value
of union membership enter all of the estimated models with particularly strong
and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects that are much greater in magnitude than the
coe¢ cients on the lagged value of union status. This indicates that there is a
considerable correlation between the unobserved individual heterogeneity and the
initial condition. This correlation becomes even more pronounced in the (1997-
2002) estimates for both genders compared to the respective (1991-1996) estimates
and it is slightly more accentuated in the male models.
The coe¢ cient on the lagged value of trade union membership enters all of the
estimated models with a generally strongly statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient, an
outcome that indicates that there is positive state dependence in union membership
status even after controlling for the unobserved e⁄ect. The prevalent correlation
between the initial condition and the unobserved individual heterogeneity renders
the pooled probit estimates inconsistent and the consequent over-statement of the
extent of state dependence is quite clear.
The pooled probit and random e⁄ects probit estimates employ di⁄erent normal-
isations. The former uses ￿2
￿ = 1 and therefore gives an estimate of ￿=￿￿ whereas
the latter employing ￿2
u = 1 reports ￿=￿u. For comparison purposes the random




￿ = ￿u= ￿￿ so that
they are converted into ￿=￿￿ (see Arulampalam, 1999). The rescaled coe¢ cients32
on lagged union membership status are reduced even further compared to the "in-
￿ ated" pooled probit estimates and in the case of both female (1997-2002) models
they are driven to statistical insigni￿cance.









p0) were estimated using the
following counter-factual probabilities that take yt￿1 to be ￿xed at 0 and 1 and are

































The average partial e⁄ects and predicted probability ratios provided at the bot-
tom of Tables (IV-VII) in the Appendix are an estimate of state dependence of
union membership. The Heckman and Wooldridge estimators generally produce
similar magnitudes while the respective pooled probit values are substantially "in-
￿ ated".
The extent of state dependence in union membership status is markedly higher
in the (1991-1996) period estimates as opposed to the (1997-2002) estimates with
31Testing for ￿ = 0 must take into account that it lies on the boundary of the parameter space
(see Stewart 2006a) .
32{1.249, 0.988; 0.256, 0.326} for the (1991-1996; 1997-2002) male models for the Heckman and
Wooldridge estimators respectively. Similarly, the corresponding values in the female models are
{0.663,0.625; 0.090,0.151}.
16regard to both genders. This outcome implies that for British employees during the
period under analysis the probability of remaining a union member has declined.
Further, the degree of state dependence in male union membership appears to be
more pronounced than the respective female dependence in both time periods under
consideration. This is not surprising as the male samples employed consist solely
of full-time employees and moreover, male labour market participation is not as
discontinuous as it is for female employees.
The predicted probability ratios in the case of the Heckman and Wooldridge
(1991-1996) estimates suggest that a male worker with a given set of observable
and unobservable attributes is 3.1 and 2.4 times, respectively, as likely to be a
union member at period t if he had been so at t￿1. The corresponding probability
ratios from the (1997-2002) estimates are 1.3 and 1.6.
A female worker possessing a given set of observable and unobservable charac-
teristics is approximately 2 and 1.7 times as likely to be a union member at period
t if she had been so at t￿1 according to the respective predicted probability ratios
from the Heckman and Wooldridge (1991-1996) estimates. Similarly, the respective
ratios from the (1997-2002) estimates suggest that a female worker is 1.1 and 1.2
times as likely to remain a union member.
4.2. Observed Individual Heterogeneity (Full-Time Male Employees)
The remaining explanatory variables were included in the two variants of the
random e⁄ects probit model in order to control for some observed heterogeneity
and were divided into personal and industrial characteristics.
Regarding the (1991-1996) estimates potential labour market experience en-
ters the Heckman random e⁄ects probit model with a positive and statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect. The interaction dummies of "University Degree or Higher" and
"Vocational Quali￿cations" with the "Public Administration, Education, Other"
industrial classi￿cation enter both variants with sizeable positive and statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cients. This is what was expected a priori as the public sector still
remains one of the most heavily unionised industries in the U.K and it is associated
with a relatively high proportion of highly skilled employees.
The occupational classi￿cation category that is excluded is "Other Occupa-
tions".33 The negative statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects in all categories excluding
"Craft and related" and "Personal and Protective Service" occupations indicate
the widespread decline in male unionisation rates during (1991-1996). The "Cleri-
cal and Secretarial" and "Sales" occupations enter only the Heckman variant with
statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients. The greater magnitude and statistical signi￿-
cance in both variants of the coe¢ cients on "Professional Occupations", "Managers
and Administrators" and "Associate Professional and Technical" suggests that in-
dividuals in white collar occupations display a greater degree of union aversion.
This outcome is not surprising as we expect employees within these occupations
to have a disincentive to become union members. This arises in that trade unions
reduce human capital premia via the standardisation of wage rates (see Abowd and
Farber, 1982). Further, white collar occupations consist of groups of highly skilled
employees that can be seen as acting as a de facto union on its own since they
33The "Other Occupations" classi￿cation consists of: "other occupations in agriculture, forestry
and ￿shing", "other occupations in mining and manufacture", "other occupations in construction",
"other occupations in transport", "other occupations in communication", "other occupations in
sales & service" and "other occupations not elsewhere classi￿ed".
17cannot be rapidly and costlessly replaced (see Blach￿ ower et al, 1990).
Turning to the industrial characteristics, the omitted area from the regional
controls is the Midlands and this was done because its unionisation rate lies ap-
proximately half way through the respective rates in the remaining regions of the
UK. Scotland enters only the Heckman variant with a negative and statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect and this means that Scottish male employees were less likely to
join a trade union as opposed to their male counterparts in the Midlands during
(1991-1996).
The size of workforce at the individual￿ s workplace enters both of the random
e⁄ects (1991-1996) model variants with positive and rather strongly statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cients in the cases of Workforce >500 and Workforce 100-499. This
e⁄ect seems to increase symmetrically with establishment size in terms of coe¢ -
cient magnitude and statistical signi￿cance as was expected a priori given that the
excluded workforce size is that of Workforce <25 employees.34 This result invali-
dates the institutionalist view that larger establishments engage in union avoidance
e⁄orts by acting as if they were unionised and o⁄ering higher wages. Instead it sup-
ports the notion that larger establishments are more likely to enjoy market power
and hence o⁄er a greater scope for unionisation since there are more quasi rents to
be bargained over.
In the (1997-2002) dynamic random e⁄ects estimates for full-time male employ-
ees the "Black" ethnic minority group enters both speci￿cations with a sizeable
positive coe¢ cient although, in the Wooldridge estimates it is only statistically
signi￿cant at the 10% level. This is in line with the expectation that individuals
belonging to ethnic minority groups might have a higher propensity toward union-
isation so as to safeguard themselves against unfair labour market discrimination.
However, the "Other Ethnic Minority Group" enters the Heckman model with a
negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
The interaction dummies of "University Degree or Higher" and "Vocational
Quali￿cations" with the "Public Administration, Education, Other" industrial clas-
si￿cation enter solely the Heckman variant this time with positive statistically sig-
ni￿cant coe¢ cients.
The control for having at least a University degree enters both variants with
a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect, though this occurs only at the 10% signi￿cance
level in the Wooldridge speci￿cation. This outcome is in line with Abowd and
Farber￿ s (1982) model that predicts that workers with a high degree of human
capital invested in themselves would be less prone towards unionisation as they
would expect to receive reduced human capital premia.
The "HND, HNC or Teaching" quali￿cation category enters both variants with
negative coe¢ cients possibly re￿ ecting the lower representation of male employees
in the teaching profession.
Considering the industrial characteristics, among regional controls Wales ap-
pears with positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients in both speci￿cations.
The North West enters only the Heckman variant with a similar positive e⁄ect.
This implies that male workers residing in these regions have a higher tendency to-
wards unionisation as opposed to those living in the Midlands which is the excluded
regional classi￿cation.
All three establishment size controls enter both models with signi￿cant and posi-
34The 25-99 establishment size control enters with a reduced coe¢ cient and a signi￿cant e⁄ect
only for the Heckman speci￿cation.
18tive e⁄ects although establishments with 100-499 employees appear with marginally
higher coe¢ cients than those with more than 500. This outcome o⁄ers further sup-
port against the institutionalist view that reverses the positive association between
establishment size and unionisation.
The omitted industrial classi￿cation category is "Energy and Water Supplies"
due to its particularly high unionisation rate. All industrial classi￿cation controls
enter both speci￿cations with negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects except
the "Public Administration, Education, Other" category.35 This classi￿cation is a
cluster of industrial sectors that have traditionally been some of the most heavily
unionised sectors in the British economy. Apparently, it does not seem to share the
fate of the British manufacturing industry, formerly the stronghold of trade unions,
in terms of rapid deunionisation.
4.3. Observed Individual Heterogeneity (Female Employees)
The time average of marital status has been included in the estimated models to
capture the correlation between the unobserved e⁄ect and the variable throughout
time. It enters both random e⁄ects probit estimators for the (1991-1996) period
with similar positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects. The weight of empirical
evidence suggests a changing pattern in the gender composition of trade union
membership in Britain. The positive coe¢ cient on mean marital status may re￿ ect
active union policies tailored to the needs of the female population in their e⁄orts to
attract more female members in an era that is characterised by rapid deunionisation
among the male labour force.
The time average of full-time employment enters the Heckman speci￿cation with
a statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient that possesses the theoretically predicted pos-
itive sign. This is consistent with the notion that the omitted part-time group is
less prone towards unionisation due to its potentially unstable labour market pres-
ence.36 The time average of maternity leave also enters the Heckman speci￿cation
with a sizeable positive signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
The interaction terms of "University Degree or Higher" and "Vocational Qual-
i￿cations" with the "Public Administration, Education, Other" appear in both
speci￿cations with positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients. The notably
sizeable coe¢ cients on the Vocational Quali￿cations interaction is not at all sur-
prising given the high representation of women in both the teaching profession
and public administration. Further, holding only A Level quali￿cations enters the
Heckman variant with a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect.
With respect to the occupational controls "Managers and Administrators",
"Clerical and Secretarial" and "Sales" all enter the Heckman speci￿cation with sig-
ni￿cantly strong negative coe¢ cients. "Managers and Administrators" and "Sales"
occupations appear in the Wooldridge variant with a similar e⁄ects although the
latter is only signi￿cant at the 10% level.
Regarding the industrial characteristics, the Heckman speci￿cation suggests that
females residing in Scotland, Wales and the North East during (1991-1996) seem
to be more likely to be union members than their counterparts in the Midlands.
Living in London and the South East enters the Heckman model with a negative
coe¢ cient signi￿cant at the 10% level. In the Wooldridge variant the North East
35The "Transport& Communication" industry is solely signi￿cant at the 10% level in the Heck-
man model.
36Costs of union membership could exceed the potential bene￿ts for this group.
19appears with a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect and Scotland does so at the not so stringent
10% level. These might be re￿ ecting di⁄erences in regional industrial structures.
Finally, with the exception of medium sized plants with 25-99 employees in
the Wooldridge variant, all of the remaining establishment size controls enter both
speci￿cations with statistically signi￿cant and positive coe¢ cients therefore, inval-
idating the negative association prediction of the institutionalist view.
Moving to the (1997-2002) random e⁄ects estimates for female labour market
participants the time averages of marital status and full-time employment enter the
Heckman model with positive signi￿cant coe¢ cients. Further, Asian females and
those belonging to the Other Ethnic minority group category enter the Heckman
speci￿cation with signi￿cant and sizeable positive coe¢ cients.
Holding only A Level quali￿cations enters both models with a signi￿cant e⁄ect
and seems to be positively associated with female union membership during the
period under consideration. This is also the case with the "University Degree or
Higher" interaction with the "Public Administration, Education, Other" industrial
classi￿cation which appears in both speci￿cations with a fairly sizeable coe¢ cient.
To complete the discussion on the personal characteristics set of variables, none
of the occupational classi￿cation dummies enters either of the random e⁄ects models
with a statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect. This outcome probably re￿ ects the fact that
female unionisation rates throughout the period concerned have been increasing
albeit not markedly.
Considering in turn the industrial attributes and primarily the regional controls,
according to both models female employees residing in London and the South East
along with those in East Anglia appear less likely to be trade union members
compared to those living in the Midlands during the (1997-2002) period. Note
that both coe¢ cients in the respective Wooldridge estimates are only statistically
signi￿cant at the 10% level. On the other hand, Wales enters both speci￿cations
with signi￿cant positive coe¢ cients.
The size of workforce e⁄ects remain qualitatively the same as in the (1991-1996)
female union membership model, although the respective (1997-2002) coe¢ cients
are of a greater magnitude and the size of the estimated coe¢ cients increases sym-
metrically with workforce size. Medium sized plants with 25-99 employees in the
Wooldridge variant are now statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level. Once more, the
estimated coe¢ cients on establishment size provide evidence that it is associated
with union membership in a positive manner.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the determinants of trade union membership in the UK
during 1991-2003. The use of longitudinal data allows us to ascertain whether
individual union membership at any point of time is a persistent phenomenon or
instead a random process. By employing three alternative methodologies to control
for the problem of initial conditions the results suggest that trade union membership
is quite persistent even after controlling for the unobserved e⁄ect.
There is evidence of a considerable correlation between the unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity and the initial condition and failure to control for this overstates
the degree of state dependence of union membership substantially. This correlation
becomes even more pronounced in the (1997-2002) estimates for both genders com-
pared to the respective (1991-1996) estimates and it is slightly more accentuated
in the male models.
20The extent of state dependence in union membership status is notably higher
in the (1991-1996) period estimates as opposed to the (1997-2002) estimates: an
outcome that implies that the probability of remaining a union member, during
the entire period under analysis, in the U.K has declined. Further, the degree
of state dependence in male union membership appears to be more pronounced
than the respective female dependence in both time periods under consideration.
This is not surprising since the male samples employed in this study consist of
full-time employees only and moreover, male labour market participation is not as
discontinuous as it is for female employees.
The analysis undertaken signi￿es that the unobserved individual heterogeneity
plays a critical role in modelling union membership status and failing to control for
this gives biased estimates. Arulampalam and Booth (2000) make a similar state-
ment and note that this is of course nothing new. It is consistent with social cus-
tom union theories that propose a plethora of union membership determinants such
as commitment to unions and solidarity which are generally not observed by the
econometrician.37 However, this is also consistent with missing data on employer
characteristics. It should be restated that while employer attributes are captured
through the industrial classi￿cation and establishment size controls these do not
su¢ ce so as to assign any speci￿c e⁄ects purely to unobserved heterogeneity.38
The observed heterogeneity estimates suggest that an individual￿ s propensity
to unionise is determined by a mixture of industrial and personal characteristics
that have a di⁄erential impact on male and female propensities. This is at odds
with earlier studies, such us Booth (1986) and Wright (1995), generally employing
cross-sectional data39 and suggesting that it is mainly the industrial characteristics
that typically have a signi￿cant impact on the propensity to unionise.
Establishment size enters all of the estimated models with the most prominent
observed heterogeneity e⁄ect, other than lagged trade union status, and is positively
associated with union membership. This is in line with the notion that larger
establishments are more likely to enjoy market power and hence o⁄er a greater
scope for unionisation since there are more quasi rents to be bargained over.40
Concerning the (1991-1996) male union membership estimates it is evident that
there is a widespread decline in male unionisation rates and it appears that em-
ployees in white collar occupations display a greater degree of union aversion. Fur-
ther, highly skilled male employees within the public sector are more likely to be
union members. This outcome is reinforced by the respective (1997-2002) esti-
mates revealing that the public sector does not seem to share the fate of the British
manufacturing industry in terms of rapid deunionisation.
Married females appear to be more likely to be a trade union member during
(1991-1996) possibly re￿ ecting the active union policies tailored to the needs of
the female population in their e⁄orts to attract more female members in an era of
declining male union membership. Highly skilled females within the public sector
have a higher propensity towards unionisation according to the observed hetero-
geneity estimates for both periods. This re￿ ects the high representation of women
in both the teaching profession and public administration which still remain two of
the most heavily unionised industries. Finally, given the increasing female unioni-
37See Arulampalam and Booth, (2000), pp.290&308.
38See Vella and Verbeek (1998), Arulampalam and Booth (2000).
39Hence failing to control for unobservable individual speci￿c e⁄ects.
40However establishment size could be acting as a proxy for union recognition (see Disney et
al,1996).
21sation rates throughout the period under analysis, the (1997-2002) female estimates
show no evidence of prevalent deunionisation across any occupational classi￿cation.
Future work could entail looking at the individual responses from the two al-
ternative membership questions and the union coverage outcomes in the BHPS in
order to detect any potential measurement error and its impact on the estimates
of union membership determinants. Further, it could involve evaluating the sen-
sitivity of the Heckman and Wooldridge estimators to the normality assumption
on the unobserved individual e⁄ects by employing a discrete mass point distribu-
tion to model the unobserved heterogeneity (see Stewart, 2006b). These are major
research tasks.
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25Appendix
                                  Table II. Descriptive Statistics (1991-1996)
Gender Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Trade Union Membership 0.4099 0.4919 0.3173 0.4655
Log (1+Potential Experience) 3.223 0.634 3.166 0.715
Marital Status 0.692 0.462 0.683 0.465
Full-Time Employment _ _ 0.672 0.469
Maternity Leave _ _ 0.011 0.104
Black (Caribbean, African, Other) 0.001 0.035 0.005 0.068
Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.014 0.116 0.008 0.090
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.009 0.093 0.005 0.068
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.300 0.458 0.300 0.458
South West 0.097 0.296 0.070 0.255
Midlands 0.167 0.373 0.158 0.365
Scotland 0.078 0.269 0.097 0.296
Wales 0.053 0.224 0.047 0.211
North West 0.110 0.313 0.112 0.316
North East 0.150 0.358 0.175 0.380
East Anglia 0.044 0.205 0.041 0.198
Other Services SIC and University Qualification or Higher 0.061 0.240 0.079 0.270
Other Services SIC and Vocational Qualifications 0.034 0.182 0.052 0.222
University Degree or Higher 0.158 0.365 0.109 0.312
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.082 0.274 0.074 0.263
A Levels 0.239 0.426 0.155 0.362
O Levels or CSE 0.333 0.471 0.426 0.495
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.157 0.364 0.199 0.399
Workforce >500 0.213 0.410 0.156 0.363
Workforce 100-499 0.303 0.460 0.228 0.419
Workforce 25-99 0.271 0.445 0.275 0.447
Workforce <25 0.213 0.409 0.340 0.474
 Industrial Classification Dummies
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 0.016 0.125 0.006 0.080
Energy and Water Supplies 0.051 0.220 0.007 0.085
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals 0.052 0.221 0.018 0.134
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries 0.156 0.363 0.050 0.219
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.122 0.328 0.067 0.250
Construction 0.044 0.204 0.006 0.076
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) 0.116 0.320 0.177 0.382
Transport & Communication 0.091 0.288 0.030 0.171
Banking & Finance 0.134 0.341 0.153 0.360
Public Administration, Education, Other 0.219 0.414 0.484 0.500
Occupational Classification Dummies
Professional Occupations 0.124 0.330 0.107 0.310
Managers & Administrators 0.180 0.384 0.097 0.296
Associate Professional & Technical 0.108 0.311 0.124 0.329
Clerical & Secretarial 0.099 0.298 0.333 0.471
Craft & related 0.182 0.386 0.026 0.161
Personal & Protective Service 0.069 0.253 0.117 0.322
Sales 0.033 0.179 0.076 0.266
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.152 0.359 0.037 0.188
Other Occupations 0.054 0.227 0.081 0.273
Number of Observations 4818 5172
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
26                                 Table III. Descriptive Statistics (1997-2002)
Gender Male Female
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Trade Union Membership 0.3471 0.4761 0.3474 0.4762
Log (1+Potential Experience) 3.558 0.456 3.544 0.467
Marital Status 0.665 0.472 0.642 0.479
Full-Time Employment _ _ 0.709 0.454
Maternity Leave _ _ 0.013 0.113
Black (Caribbean, African, Other) 0.002 0.047 0.006 0.079
Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.111
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.007 0.080 0.005 0.072
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East 0.269 0.444 0.282 0.450
South West 0.094 0.291 0.095 0.293
Midlands 0.192 0.394 0.172 0.377
Scotland 0.078 0.268 0.089 0.285
Wales 0.056 0.230 0.050 0.219
North West 0.102 0.303 0.111 0.315
North East 0.170 0.376 0.160 0.366
East Anglia 0.040 0.195 0.041 0.198
Other Services SIC and University Qualification or Higher 0.052 0.222 0.101 0.301
Other Services SIC and Vocational Qualifications 0.024 0.152 0.052 0.221
University Degree or Higher 0.169 0.375 0.133 0.340
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.087 0.281 0.078 0.268
A Levels 0.267 0.442 0.225 0.418
O Levels or CSE 0.345 0.475 0.409 0.492
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.181 0.385 0.206 0.404
Workforce >500 0.206 0.405 0.173 0.379
Workforce 100-499 0.297 0.457 0.213 0.409
Workforce 25-99 0.248 0.432 0.271 0.445
Workforce <25 0.249 0.432 0.343 0.475
 Industrial Classification Dummies
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 0.006 0.078 0.005 0.067
Energy and Water Supplies 0.025 0.155 0.007 0.083
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals 0.053 0.225 0.014 0.116
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries 0.138 0.345 0.030 0.171
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.151 0.359 0.062 0.241
Construction 0.055 0.227 0.006 0.079
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) 0.122 0.327 0.185 0.388
Transport & Communication 0.105 0.307 0.036 0.187
Banking & Finance 0.143 0.350 0.154 0.361
Public Administration, Education, Other 0.202 0.401 0.502 0.500
Occupational Classification Dummies
Professional Occupations 0.098 0.297 0.106 0.308
Managers & Administrators 0.196 0.397 0.120 0.325
Associate Professional & Technical 0.110 0.312 0.141 0.349
Clerical & Secretarial 0.081 0.273 0.302 0.459
Craft & related 0.202 0.401 0.021 0.143
Personal & Protective Service 0.059 0.235 0.131 0.338
Sales 0.035 0.183 0.090 0.287
Plant & Machine Operatives 0.158 0.365 0.030 0.170
Other Occupations 0.063 0.243 0.059 0.235
Number of Observations 5538 5760
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
27Table IV: Dynamic Random Effects Probit Models of Union Membership (1991-1996), Males
Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 2.562 43.040 1.731 10.380 1.331 10.330
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 2.164 8.460
Log(1+Potential Experience) 0.117 1.850 0.349 2.800 0.068 0.610
Marital Status 0.039 0.200 -0.047 -0.210 -0.046 -0.200
Mean(Marital Status) 0.060 0.290 0.289 1.110 0.238 0.890
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) -0.096 -0.370 0.161 0.360 -0.516 -1.110
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.431 0.630 0.169 0.190 -0.266 -0.230
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.119 0.370 0.369 0.680 -0.040 -0.070
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.094 -1.060 -0.203 -1.350 -0.203 -1.280
South West -0.146 -1.260 -0.351 -1.750 -0.183 -0.900
Scotland -0.269 -2.030 -0.439 -1.970 -0.366 -1.580
Wales 0.171 1.170 0.362 1.490 0.407 1.560
North West 0.095 0.870 0.291 1.510 0.053 0.280
North East -0.071 -0.700 -0.015 -0.090 -0.221 -1.220
East Anglia -0.183 -1.160 -0.284 -1.070 -0.253 -0.910
Other Services SIC&Univ. Qualification/Higher 0.604 3.860 1.133 4.260 0.727 2.850
Other Services SIC&Vocational Qualifications 0.584 2.850 0.940 2.830 0.882 2.480
University Degree or Higher -0.079 -0.510 -0.142 -0.580 -0.088 -0.340
HND, HNC, Teaching 0.083 0.500 0.237 0.860 0.146 0.500
A Levels 0.057 0.580 0.180 1.100 0.119 0.690
O Levels or CSE 0.086 0.990 0.178 1.230 0.170 1.120
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.143 1.290 0.153 1.200 0.156 1.150
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) -0.264 -1.600 -0.306 -1.280 -0.281 -1.110
Workforce >500 0.441 4.690 0.673 5.220 0.545 3.930
Workforce 100-499 0.377 4.360 0.507 4.420 0.413 3.240
Workforce 25-99 0.215 2.410 0.252 2.190 0.208 1.630
Professional Occupations -0.560 -3.360 -0.831 -3.370 -0.777 -2.900
Managers & Administrators -0.648 -4.240 -1.028 -4.310 -0.817 -3.300
Associate Professional & Technical -0.446 -2.740 -0.747 -3.060 -0.526 -2.020
Clerical & Secretarial -0.307 -1.940 -0.553 -2.370 -0.387 -1.550
Craft & related -0.260 -1.790 -0.343 -1.650 -0.232 -1.000
Personal & Protective Service 0.028 0.170 -0.104 -0.420 0.233 0.870
Sales -0.607 -2.560 -0.894 -2.770 -0.541 -1.560
Plant & Machine Operatives -0.317 -2.150 -0.480 -2.210 -0.499 -2.110
Time Dummy 1993 _ _ _ _ -0.002 -0.010
Time Dummy 1994 -0.035 -0.450 -0.047 -0.530 -0.037 -0.340
Time Dummy 1995 0.057 0.720 0.040 0.450 0.075 0.680
Time Dummy 1996 0.133 1.670 0.140 1.560 0.211 1.890
Constant -1.782 -6.420 -2.373 -4.890 -2.198 -4.590
ρ _ _ 0.479 4.110 0.449 7.146
θ _ _ 3.140 1.820 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.800 0.462 0.375
Predicted Probability Ratio 9.007 3.138 2.449
Log-Likelihood -1142.13 -1524.70 -1066.65
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
28Table V: Dynamic Random  Effects Probit Models of Union Membership (1997-2002), Males
Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 2.412 42.410 0.697 4.470 0.569 4.670
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 3.680 11.500
Log(1+Potential Experience) 0.017 0.240 0.033 0.100 0.044 0.250
Marital Status 0.038 0.200 0.263 0.950 0.263 0.970
Mean(Marital Status) -0.053 -0.270 -0.036 -0.090 -0.245 -0.770
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) 0.436 1.680 1.289 1.970 1.104 1.770
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.058 0.110 1.197 1.520 -0.934 -0.590
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.123 -0.370 -1.612 -2.470 -1.481 -1.390
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.130 -1.540 -0.221 -0.880 -0.326 -1.500
South West 0.077 0.710 0.384 0.830 0.368 1.320
Scotland 0.062 0.510 0.512 1.730 0.151 0.490
Wales 0.345 2.630 1.633 4.600 0.732 2.240
North West 0.205 1.950 1.636 3.250 0.295 1.090
North East -0.009 -0.100 0.525 1.640 -0.041 -0.180
East Anglia 0.034 0.240 0.718 1.840 0.061 0.170
Other Services SIC&Univ. Qualification/Higher 0.403 2.350 0.798 2.130 0.319 0.840
Other Services SIC&Vocational Qualifications 0.223 1.030 1.645 3.120 0.472 0.960
University Degree or Higher -0.448 -3.300 -1.175 -2.690 -0.617 -1.880
HND, HNC, Teaching -0.381 -2.650 -1.644 -3.520 -0.817 -2.270
A Levels -0.010 -0.100 -0.021 -0.050 0.168 0.690
O Levels or CSE 0.000 0.000 -0.069 -0.190 0.204 0.880
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health -0.102 -1.030 -0.135 -0.990 -0.154 -1.130
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) 0.009 0.060 -0.347 -1.020 0.123 0.390
Workforce >500 0.604 6.760 1.168 6.260 0.902 5.370
Workforce 100-499 0.615 7.370 1.169 6.060 0.974 6.170
Workforce 25-99 0.356 4.050 0.641 3.670 0.548 3.460
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -1.187 -2.300 -2.613 -1.970 -2.580 -2.200
Extraction of Minerals & Manufacture of Metals -0.796 -3.700 -1.481 -2.830 -1.303 -3.160
Metal Goods, Engineering & Vehicles Industries -0.941 -4.730 -1.157 -3.260 -1.086 -2.850
Other Manufacturing Industries -0.826 -4.210 -1.157 -3.310 -1.189 -3.210
Construction -0.876 -3.970 -1.276 -3.290 -1.104 -2.670
Distribution, Hotels & Catering (Repairs) -1.122 -5.340 -1.767 -4.730 -1.500 -3.720
Transport & Communication -0.475 -2.370 -0.645 -1.660 -0.770 -1.970
Banking & Finance -0.837 -4.230 -1.343 -3.670 -1.129 -2.850
Public Administration, Education, Other -0.351 -1.790 -0.199 -0.530 -0.280 -0.720
Time Dummy 1999 _ _ _ _ -0.359 -3.030
Time Dummy 2000 0.031 0.410 0.002 0.020 -0.178 -1.510
Time Dummy 2001 -0.031 -0.400 -0.031 -0.290 -0.202 -1.700
Time Dummy 2002 0.112 1.410 0.230 1.950 0.056 0.450
Constant -1.102 -3.170 -1.615 -1.120 -2.149 -2.600
ρ _ _ 0.865 26.760 0.672 16.724
θ _ _ 1.164 6.030 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.767 0.095 0.089
Predicted Probability Ratio 9.737 1.310 1.592
Log-Likelihood -1258.97 -1595.28 -1078.95
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
29Table VI: Dynamic Random Effects Probit Models of Union Membership (1991-1996), Females
Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 2.095 37.920 1.083 10.150 0.909 9.010
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 2.072 10.700
Log(1+Potential Experience) 0.082 1.670 0.132 1.250 0.095 0.980
Marital Status -0.115 -0.750 -0.120 -0.650 -0.157 -0.830
Mean(Marital Status) 0.352 2.090 0.621 2.570 0.589 2.500
Full-Time Employment 0.037 0.300 0.109 0.720 0.138 0.900
Mean(Full-Time Employment) 0.261 1.800 0.755 3.280 0.297 1.390
Maternity Leave 0.026 0.100 -0.049 -0.170 -0.074 -0.250
Mean(Maternity Leave) 0.857 1.340 2.765 2.050 1.638 1.350
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) 0.317 1.030 0.682 0.970 0.554 0.870
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) -0.010 -0.030 0.447 0.570 -0.496 -0.720
Other Ethnic Minority Group -0.171 -0.420 -0.483 -0.510 -0.690 -0.750
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.148 -1.750 -0.337 -1.860 -0.117 -0.700
South West -0.071 -0.570 -0.188 -0.680 -0.055 -0.220
Scotland 0.215 2.030 0.524 2.220 0.397 1.850
Wales 0.258 1.980 0.641 2.170 0.395 1.480
North West 0.012 0.120 0.090 0.400 -0.098 -0.470
North East 0.254 2.860 0.608 3.030 0.384 2.120
East Anglia -0.079 -0.510 -0.347 -1.000 0.046 0.150
Other Services SIC&Univ. Qualification/Higher 0.809 3.910 1.369 3.870 0.840 2.450
Other Services SIC&Vocational Qualifications 1.207 4.040 2.147 4.290 1.641 3.370
University Degree or Higher -0.407 -1.960 -0.315 -0.830 -0.298 -0.820
HND, HNC, Teaching -0.621 -2.200 -0.773 -1.600 -0.671 -1.430
A Levels 0.141 1.420 0.434 2.050 0.282 1.450
O Levels or CSE 0.089 1.180 0.252 1.540 0.147 0.980
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.121 1.390 0.129 1.240 0.122 1.150
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) -0.253 -1.890 -0.357 -1.420 -0.247 -1.070
Workforce >500 0.340 4.230 0.534 4.020 0.402 3.020
Workforce 100-499 0.247 3.310 0.335 2.730 0.291 2.360
Workforce 25-99 0.183 2.620 0.209 1.910 0.139 1.260
Professional Occupations -0.119 -0.800 -0.293 -1.070 -0.435 -1.620
Managers & Administrators -0.359 -2.600 -0.599 -2.420 -0.556 -2.300
Associate Professional & Technical -0.021 -0.160 0.046 0.190 -0.052 -0.220
Clerical & Secretarial -0.212 -1.920 -0.434 -2.010 -0.322 -1.560
Craft & related -0.006 -0.040 0.112 0.320 0.044 0.130
Personal & Protective Service -0.028 -0.230 -0.028 -0.130 0.064 0.290
Sales -0.356 -2.490 -0.679 -2.570 -0.430 -1.680
Plant & Machine Operatives -0.297 -1.740 -0.369 -1.160 -0.327 -1.060
Time Dummy 1993 _ _ _ _ 0.166 1.660
Time Dummy 1994 -0.109 -1.500 -0.127 -1.460 -0.024 -0.240
Time Dummy 1995 0.085 1.180 0.113 1.300 0.216 2.110
Time Dummy 1996 0.257 3.590 0.401 4.470 0.532 5.060
Constant -2.086 -9.330 -3.080 -6.330 -3.160 -7.040
ρ _ _ 0.625 13.050 0.527 11.595
θ _ _ 1.098 6.540 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.704 0.247 0.244
Predicted Probability Ratio 6.407 1.964 1.712
Log-Likelihood -1446.08 -1758.06 -1331.85
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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Pooled Probit Heckman Wooldridge
Variable Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z
Lagged Trade Union Membership 1.995 38.460 0.235 2.260 0.298 2.920
Trade Union Membership (1) _ _ _ _ 3.303 12.950
Log(1+Potential Experience) -0.015 -0.260 -0.176 -0.730 0.005 0.030
Marital Status -0.010 -0.060 0.193 0.860 0.212 0.950
Mean(Marital Status) 0.257 1.500 0.710 2.150 0.441 1.550
Full-Time Employment -0.067 -0.610 -0.022 -0.150 0.012 0.090
Mean(Full-Time Employment) 0.288 2.230 1.074 3.400 0.400 1.590
Maternity Leave -0.025 -0.110 -0.148 -0.480 -0.131 -0.420
Mean(Maternity Leave) 0.226 0.410 1.689 1.040 0.854 0.540
Black(Caribbean, African, Other) 0.059 0.280 0.233 0.470 -0.112 -0.160
Asian(Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Other) 0.843 2.040 4.272 2.920 1.973 1.500
Other Ethnic Minority Group 0.536 1.690 1.899 2.520 1.496 1.560
Inner/ Outer London and R of South East -0.211 -2.830 -0.989 -3.830 -0.422 -1.890
South West -0.148 -1.500 -0.532 -1.660 -0.449 -1.540
Scotland 0.168 1.750 0.498 1.520 0.426 1.480
Wales 0.322 2.700 1.303 2.960 0.728 2.020
North West 0.015 0.170 -0.322 -0.830 0.038 0.140
North East 0.128 1.570 0.353 1.340 0.365 1.540
East Anglia -0.280 -2.030 -1.090 -2.260 -0.751 -1.850
Other Services SIC&Univ. Qualification/Higher 1.110 6.000 3.006 5.960 2.324 4.980
Other Services SIC&Vocational Qualifications 0.472 2.500 1.005 1.440 0.476 1.030
University Degree or Higher -0.565 -3.020 -1.059 -2.140 -0.976 -1.980
HND, HNC, Teaching -0.107 -0.630 0.249 0.300 0.602 1.320
A Levels 0.127 1.460 0.682 2.430 0.579 2.240
O Levels or CSE 0.089 1.150 0.247 1.010 0.370 1.600
Fair, Poor, V Poor Self-Assessed Health 0.017 0.210 -0.042 -0.380 -0.126 -1.130
Mean(Fair,Poor,V Poor Self-Assessed Health) -0.079 -0.650 -0.267 -0.640 0.039 0.130
Workforce >500 0.430 6.010 0.781 4.670 0.705 4.700
Workforce 100-499 0.251 3.730 0.649 4.380 0.555 4.020
Workforce 25-99 0.187 2.960 0.297 2.320 0.221 1.790
Professional Occupations 0.080 0.580 0.307 1.100 0.119 0.420
Managers & Administrators -0.312 -2.490 -0.266 -1.030 -0.305 -1.160
Associate Professional & Technical -0.001 -0.010 0.176 0.700 0.115 0.450
Clerical & Secretarial -0.181 -1.670 -0.023 -0.090 -0.154 -0.630
Craft & related -0.137 -0.700 -0.109 -0.270 -0.146 -0.350
Personal & Protective Service -0.069 -0.590 0.178 0.680 0.154 0.590
Sales -0.308 -2.390 -0.421 -1.490 -0.304 -1.090
Plant & Machine Operatives -0.236 -1.390 0.007 0.020 -0.204 -0.570
Time Dummy 1999 _ _ _ _ -0.672 -6.300
Time Dummy 2000 0.360 5.560 0.550 5.980 0.230 2.220
Time Dummy 2001 -0.302 -4.450 -0.142 -1.530 -0.494 -4.580
Time Dummy 2002 0.387 5.940 0.701 7.310 0.380 3.600
Constant -1.638 -6.350 -2.767 -2.620 -3.275 -4.270
ρ _ _ 0.853 42.570 0.744 27.086
θ _ _ 0.729 8.190 _ _
Average Partial Effect 0.672 0.036 0.047
Predicted Probability Ratio 4.157 1.080 1.214
Log-Likelihood -1766.94 -1980.20 -1485.09
Source: BHPS (1991-2003), ISER, Essex, SN:4967, June 2004
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